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By Georgy Toloraya
Abstract
Russia, one of the four important players in Korea, is focused on 
Korea due to its “turn to the East” policy. It is increasingly less 
interested in a momentous Korean unification under the ROK’s 
guidance which would result in a sudden shift of balance of power 
in the region. The nuclear issue is also less urgent now, while the 
goals of stability and peaceful dialogue, cooperation, and eventual 
reconciliation between the two Koreas are at the forefront. 
A collapse of the DPRK, not impossible in principle, is not imminent. 
Pressure and isolation do not bring it any closer. The stand-off 
between the  U.S. and Russia and the rivalry between the  U.S. and 
China make it doubtful that the DPRK can be brought down peacefully 
in a “soft landing” scenario. The alternative is “conventionalizing” 
North Korea through evolutional internal reforms—impossible in 
the absence of security guarantees. The resilience of the North 
Korean regime may prompt Seoul and Washington to take into 
consideration the interests of the Northern ruling class. 
Russia can help implement such a policy in cooperation with the 
ROK and  U.S. Recently, Russia-North Korean relations warmed 
up and many new economic projects are being discussed. Most 
important are the trilateral economic projects involving South 
Korea, such as railroads, which North Korea supports. 
The first step might be for South Korea to lift sanctions and 
increase engagement efforts. Denuclearization of North Korea is 
possible only in the distant future and should not be a stumbling 
block for dialogue. Such a dialogue (including a multilateral one) 
should guarantee a freeze on the North Korean nuclear program 
and step-by-step dismantling of it, hedging against the risk of 
change in strategic balance and proliferation. 
Key words: Russian policy in Korea; Korea unification; North 
Korea; nuclear problem; trilateral projects
Introduction
The Korean issue remains a long-term concern for Russia, 
especially now that the “turn to the East” was declared as the 
most important innovative feature of Russian policy in the 
second decade of 21st century. Russia remains at stake in Korean 
unification and security issues—generally considered to hold 4th 
place after the United States, China, and Japan. However, some 
influential Russian experts1 argue that Russia holds 3rd place, 
ahead of Japan, claiming that Japan abstains from using its ability 
to influence the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
This paper concentrates on Russia’s position on inter-Korean 
relations and its attitude towards the modalities and prospects 
of a possible Korean unification. Our first question is what are 
Russia’s real – not declaratory – interests in Korean unification 
and its capabilities of promoting or discouraging it? Is it true that 
Russian interests in Korea are scarce? The Russian factor in Korean 
affairs has largely been neglected after the break up of the Soviet 
Union. In the 1990s, Russia was supposed to follow the  U.S. 
lead in pressuring North Korea on the nuclear issue. When this 
did not happen, it was perceived as a deviation, a breach of trust 
on Russia’s part, not a manifestation of an independent policy by 
Moscow. It was also taken for granted that Russia would support a 
South-led unification, essentially absorption of North Korea by the 
South. After all, the logic went, such an event would lead to the 
disappearance of a hotbed of tension near the Russian border and 
would result in the emergence of a new powerful partner, led by 
economic cooperation, and a unified Korea.
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These assessments changed with the advent of the crisis in 
Ukraine, which clearly showed the geopolitical divide between 
Russia and the West. That historic shift made Russia’s policy 
makers re-assess priorities. The rebalancing of foreign policy is 
underway with a greater accent on relations with China and other 
non-Western powers. In Asia and the Pacific, there is an obvious 
tilt towards containing the United States and its allies in Asia, as 
European dimension is in such a sorrowful state for Russia.
Korean unification under ROK guidance – and no other is 
imaginable at the moment – would result in a sudden shift of 
balance of power in the Far East. It would mean a revision of the 
results of the Second World War, upon which the global system 
has been based for over 70 years, and a possible change for the 
worse regarding security surroundings for China. This all might be 
detrimental to Russia’s interests. A unified Korea, even with the 
unlikely event of a  U.S. troop withdrawal, would still remain an ally 
of the United States and one with much more power (for example, 
territorial claims to China and even Russia cannot be excluded). 
Therefore, Russia’s policy goal in Korea is to maintain the existing 
security structure for stability. That means preventing any 
sudden changes associated with unification or a serious setback 
in North Korea’s security positions. Any emergencies or a collapse 
scenario in this nuclear-armed state are highly undesirable. 
What then are the possible areas of Russia’s cooperation with 
the regional partners - including the  U.S., ROK, and Japan? 
After all, the situation on the Korean Peninsula remains one of 
the few international issues where Russia and the United States 
cooperate, as noted by President Putin himself.2
Russia’s Policy to Promote Inter-Korean Relations
Russian influence on Korean affairs is often neglected, or the 
improvement of relations with DPRK is lately mocked as a “union 
of outcasts.” However, lately Russia’s national interests include 
stability in this neighboring area and promotion of mutually 
beneficial economic projects. Now that Russia’s global policies are 
determined by growing confrontation with the West, its desire to 
advance in Asia and the Pacific both economically and politically—
which has been quite obvious in the last several years—became 
even more pronounced. Northeast Asia, closest to Russian borders 
and home for the three most important economies of Asia as well 
as leading Russia’s political and economic partners, is pivotal for 
Russia’s deeper involvement into Asia. The Korean Peninsula in 
this context is the key to Asia.
Russia recognizes that the goal of DPRK denuclearization is 
hardly attainable for the moment. So any diplomatic process is 
only a tool to hedge the risks, stop North Korea from improving 
its arsenal, and prevent nuclear proliferation. At the same time, 
the non-proliferation issue cannot be suitably solved without 
addressing broader security issues. 
Potential reforms in the neighboring country would constitute 
a chance for Moscow to improve its positions in Northeast Asia 
and contribute to implementation of economic projects, which 
would then help stabilize DPRK’s economic situation.
In 2014-2015, Russian leverage on North Korea was consistently 
growing as relations improved, mostly by North Korean initiative. 
Confrontation with the West suddenly brought both countries 
closer together: North Korea stresses, especially in contacts by 
the military, a “common threat.” Moreover, North Korea deserves 
attention since it has regrettably become one of the few public 
supporters of Russia on the Ukrainian issue.
It should be noted that the current upsurge in bilateral 
relations happened mostly as a result of Pyongyang’s sudden 
preparedness to answer Moscow’s overtures. Russia in fact 
started to implement the doctrine of “standing on both legs” on 
the Korean Peninsula since the early 2000s. It was then that the 
basic agreements between Putin and Kim Jong-il were reached 
which bear fruit today (the issues of debt problem solution, 
trilateral projects, logistics development can all be found in the 
2000 and 2001 summit declarations). The process stagnated 
because of the North’s nuclear tests when Russia reluctantly 
joined international sanctions, but the Medvedev-Kim Jong-
il summit in 2011 (symbolically the last meeting with a foreign 
head of state for the late North Korean leader) reinvigorated it. 
Kim’s death and the process of power transition in Pyongyang 
delayed the process. However, when Russian experts concluded 
that the Kim Jong-un regime was stable enough to deal with, 
negotiations on several major economic projects and political 
“Therefore, Russia’s policy 
goal in Korea is to maintain 
the existing security structure 
for stability.”  
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consultations between the DPRK and Russia started—at North 
Korea’s prompting.
The most obvious and widely discussed reason for North Korea 
to reach out to Russia was to move away from overdependence 
on China. When Xi went to Seoul first and “chose South” instead 
of North, Pyongyang became openly critical towards Beijing and 
turned to Russia. There was a flurry of bilateral visits in 2014 
and early 2015, mostly devoted to economic projects. Several 
high-profile political visits to Russia took place all within a year: 
Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong, “Second in command” Secretary 
Choe Ryong Hae, Vice Prime-Minister Ro Du Chol, and Minister 
of Defence Hyon Yong Chol (his purge is hardly related to his 
meetings in Russia, as they were rather symbolic). Russian 
Vice-Premier Yu Trutnev and Minister of Far East Development 
Alexander Galushka also visited Pyongyang. 
In April 2015, the 7th session of the Intergovernmental Commission 
took place in Pyongyang. A “Year of Friendship” was officially 
inaugurated on April 14th (to last until October 2015, when a closing 
ceremony is to be held in Pyongyang). The plan provided for 
increased delegation exchange – such as visits of Russia’s Federation 
Council Chairman and Vice-Premier to Pyongyang and reciprocal 
visits of their Korean counterparts. A special plan of cultural 
events was adopted, comprising visits of sister cities delegations, 
numerous sport exchanges, exchanges in educational sphere, 
delegations of scientists (including that of social scientists from 
DPRK, which is noteworthy), and increase in tourism. Special 
“Weeks of Friendship” will take place. More than a dozen treaties 
and agreements are planned for signing within this period.
Although the expected visit of Kim Jong-un to Russia did not 
materialize, the trend to work out the broad long-term basis of 
economic cooperation continues. In 2014-2015, negotiations on 
different economic projects for government and business were 
of a scale unprecedented for the last three decades. Bilateral 
economic cooperation negotiations between Russia and North 
Korea have seemingly reached the same level as after the 
remarkable Kim Il-sung visit to the USSR in 1984. The previous 
upsurge bore some fruit: new “compensation,” procession-on-
commission projects (when Russia supplied equipment and raw 
materials getting ready-made goods as a compensation), re-
orientation of North Korean exports towards the USSR, feasibility 
studies for nuclear power plants and other grand-scale projects. 
It was short-lived, however. Increasing difficulties for the Soviet 
economy put a cap on cooperation after trade (including 
economic assistance) and peaked in 1987 at 1.4 billion rubles (the 
equivalent of about $2.7 billion) taking into consideration then 
prices and rate of exchange). After this, trade and investment 
fell to almost zero in the 1990s. The short period between 2000-
2002 saw some revival of commerce as a result of the political 
rapprochement but the liberal-minded Russian economic 
establishment came close to sabotaging politically motivated 
arrangements, reluctant to deal with the “doomed regime” 
and waste money on aid to it. Negotiations on debt repayment 
started immediately after meetings between Vladimir Putin and 
Kim Jong-il in 2000-2001, but dragged for a decade.
Is the situation we are currently witnessing different? How much 
aid can Russia possibly provide? Is there any form of mutually 
beneficial trade possible for the two countries? Can negotiations 
result in a real increase in trade (the target is $1 billion by 2020: 
half the peak level of the 1980s)? Official statistics put Russia-
DPRK trade below $100 million per year, and last year this dropped 
to $92 million, with a further drop in the early months of 2015. 
However, this does not include shipments via third countries, 
which are sometimes quite significant. Nevertheless it is true 
that such “uncentralized” (at least, on the Russian side) economic 
cooperation is unlikely to be on any sizable scale, because 
businessmen tend to avoid the uncertainties and limitations on 
financial transactions involved in dealing with heavily sanctioned 
North Korea. In October 2014 the two countries agreed on settling 
the accounts in rubles, without the involvement of  U.S. banks 
or  U.S. dollars. Business transactions between North Korea and 
Russia had reached 3.5 billion rubles ($67 million) in value by April.
A new cooperation concept seems to be emerging from the 
Russian leadership’s increased attention to the DPRK. Russia’s 
overall approach is very pragmatic: Anything the North Koreans 
want they should pay for, and in advance. North Korea’s most 
valuable resources are minerals and raw materials, and these have 
been at the center of most deals. The second pillar of Russian 
strategy – to attract South Korean capital into trilateral projects – 
could really become a game-changer in regional cooperation. 
The creation of infrastructure for economic cooperation is 
now underway. Both countries have agreed to appoint “project 
commissioners” who will work to reduce red tape and streamline 
business interactions, acting as “unique points of contact” for 
strategic projects. For the first time, a Russia-North Korea business 
council has been created to find solutions to the problems of 
visa issuance and developing better communications. Lately 
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many bilateral agreements and framework memoranda of 
understanding have been agreed upon, ranging from automobile 
transportation to sanitary control of agricultural products, from 
debt repayment and agreements on settling accounts in rubles 
to the new rules regarding North Korean workers. Unlike in the 
past, sectoral meetings have become regular, and there are now 
several dozen tracks of government-to-government, business-to-
government, as well as business-to-business negotiations. 
During the above-mentioned intergovernmental session in 
Pyongyang, attended by 60 Russian delegates, 25 working groups 
discussed different avenues for potential cooperation. In fact, the 
grand overall program of cooperation was agreed upon, based 
on years of feasibility studies. The North Korean side suggested 
many barter operations given the lack of financial resources at 
its disposal, with interest by some Russian companies (like coal 
in exchange for pig iron, etc). Many of the projects are based 
on modernization of plants and facilities, created in cooperation 
with the former Soviet Union. New projects are also under 
discussion. The North Koreans are especially interested in getting 
a supply of energy from the Russian Far East and are ready to pay 
in copper from Onsan deposits. Russian companies expressed 
interest in revitalizing North Korea’s hydro and coal fired power 
plants and agreed to set up a special working group to study the 
issue of electricity supply to the Korean Peninsula, including an 
analysis of possible route supplies of fuel and energy balances 
of the participating countries and the cost of electricity. In 
addition, wind generators may be supplied to North Korea. 
Russian companies are interested in getting magnesite and 
developing mineral deposits. It is agreed that Russian geologists 
would conduct a survey of mineral resources in the DPRK, based 
on the materials which were accumulated during decades of 
Russia-DPRK cooperation. The DPRK is interested in exporting 
agricultural and fishery products.
Both sides agreed on cooperation in the special economic 
zones of the two countries (they are called Territories of Priority 
Development in the Far East) and will probably create a trilateral 
zone with participation from the two Koreas. The DPRK is 
interested in Russian investment in the Wonsan-Kumgansan 
tourist zone.
While Russia and North Korea have in principle found the balance 
between North Korea’s desire to get aid and Russia’s intention 
to get profit, the agreements that have already been reached 
are very hard to implement. Despite the de facto advance of a 
market economy of sorts in North Korea, Russian businessmen 
are experiencing the same old hurdles, familiar after decades 
of cooperation under the Soviet Union: short-term pursuit of 
individual gain, unilateral modifications of agreements, the 
introduction of new rules (sometimes retroactive) unfavorable 
to investors, breach of obligations, and late delivery. Decision-
making mechanisms in North Korea are still opaque, despite 
promises by the North Koreans to let Russians get acquainted 
with legal regulations, previously inaccessible to foreigners 
(which made it easy for North Koreans to present their decisions 
as based on internal law). However, in practice, even this does 
not help much. Decisions are often based on the spontaneous 
impulses of higher authorities that cannot be contacted 
for explanations, and there is general lack of coordination 
between different branches of the state system and economic 
organizations. Problems with communication persist. 
Joining Hands with South Korea? 
What can the above-mentioned increase in Russia-North 
Korean cooperation bring to improve inter-Korean relations? 
Can it prepare for an eventual unification? As far as Moscow is 
concerned, potential three-party projects attracting South Korean 
investment into North Korea via Russia are the most promising 
venture. They can bring much-needed financing, provide markets 
for Russia and North Korea in the South, and vice versa. Such 
projects are also important geopolitically and geoeconomically 
for promoting regional peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
They are seen both as a source of mutual prosperity and as a tool 
to help the North Korean economy modernize, as well as a way 
to build mutual trust and improve the political atmosphere.
This concept was proposed by Russian policy makers in the 1990s. 
Despite the common misperception, North Korea has always been 
in favor of such projects, and it is well documented in Russia-DPRK 
bilateral dealings. North Koreans essentially say “we do not care 
where you get the money for the projects in our land.” Russia 
has tried to solicit the support of the Park government—viewed 
in Russia as more pragmatic and less extremist than the previous 
administration—and gained moderate success during the 2013 
Russia-ROK summit in Seoul, when President Park agreed to 
South Korean participation in the Khasan-Rajin railroad project. 
Especially now, when a new course for establishing free economic 
zones has been declared by the North with great fanfare, North 
Koreans are more than eager to use Russian offices to get South 
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Korean investments. For example, the Basic Element company 
recently expressed its interest in trilateral projects. South Korean 
state corporation K-Water is engaged with Russia’s RusHydro state 
company on possible cooperation in North Korea. K-Water has 
discussed various issues with RusHydro, including water resource 
investigation, flood prevention, hydro-electric generation, and 
renewable energy. The creation of a common electrical grid for the 
three countries for exporting Russian energy is not out of question.
The Trans-Korea Railway/Trans-Siberian Railway (TKR-TSR) 
project is now a priority for the Russian railroad company, 
although it was hotly debated in the early 2000s. Russia had to 
unilaterally invest into the pilot project linking its border with 
North Korea’s Rajin port. It is worth noting that Russia and North 
Korea see it as a pilot project for a future Trans-Korean railroad 
connecting to the Trans-Siberian line (as stated in the Moscow 
Summit Declaration of 2001). The Russia-DPRK joint venture 
Rasoncontrans was created in 2009 and work at the Khasan-Rajin 
route started in October 2008, when the agreement was signed 
between the DPRK Ministry of Railroads and Russia’s RZhD state 
company. As a result, 54 km of railroad were rebuilt, 18 bridges 
and three tunnels were constructed. The universal terminal in 
Rajin port is also being constructed, with the potential for four 
million tons of cargo passing through it. The first test run of the 
trains was undertaken in October 2011, and in September 2013 
the railroad was officially opened. Since 2014, Korean companies 
such as Posco, Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. and Korea Railroad 
Corporation have started to study the feasibility of participating 
in the construction of railways, ports, and harbors associated 
with this project. In 2014, 100,000 tons of coal were transported 
via Rajin, and another 100,000 tons are contracted for shipping 
in 2015. The second shipment of Russian coal will be sent from 
the DPRK’s Rajin port to Pohang. The Koreans agreed to provide 
capacity for transportation of five million tons of cargo on the 
Khasan-Rajin route.
Other trilateral projects not in the limelight are also important. 
The power line connecting the Russian Far East, where excessive 
electricity generation capacity for export exists, with South 
Korea as an export market has been discussed for many years. 
In 2009, a number of agreements between Russian Inter RAO 
UES and South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO) were signed. Because of deterioration in the relations 
between North and South Korea, this project was shelved. 
However, Russia remains committed to the project and has been 
discussing it recently on a bilateral basis. Russian Minister of Far 
East Alexander Galushka, after visiting North Korea in October 
2014, announced that the DPRK had agreed to build an energy 
bridge from Russia to South Korea. Russian energy company RAO 
Energy System of East is looking to develop a feasibility study on 
delivering power to North Korea’s Rason region. The short-term 
plan was to deliver 200 megawatts (MW) of power to Rason by 
2016, with demand in the region expected to triple to 600 MW 
by 2025.
Of most significance is the fate of the gas pipeline project, which 
was agreed to at the summit level between Russia and North 
Korea in 2011. It was to become a real game-changer since 
the pipeline enhances the energy security of South Korea and 
brings North Korea benefits without any concessions or dangers 
associated with “opening.” The project has been pursued since 
2003 (when the Russian Gazprom state company and South 
Korean KOGAS signed a cooperation agreement). In September 
2011, the “roadmap” was signed for construction (an investment 
of $2.5 billion will be needed, supplying a volume of 12 billion 
cubic meters per year). The gas pipeline in Korea, because of 
external (the need to get a connection to the Asian gas market) 
and internal factors (the need to diversify production and exports 
as well as to use Gazprom’s existing capacity to build pipelines), 
was one of the most important Russian economic undertakings 
in Asia and the Pacific. The project was also critical for Russia’s 
Korea policy, as it fully corresponded with Moscow’s desire 
to establish itself as a player on the peninsula. It would help 
promote inter-Korean cooperation, guarantee stability and assist 
the DPRK in improving its economic situation, as well as increase 
the North’s chances for economic modernization.
However, the project became a political hostage, involving not 
only South and North Korea, but also the  U.S. and China. A 
political decision by the South Korean government (Russia and 
the DPRK have already explicitly confirmed their readiness to 
implement this project) to approve the project was never made. 
Moreover, South Korean importers had insisted on “special 
terms” that were far from realistic (as if it was only Russia 
who needed the pipeline). Therefore, Gazprom is now building 
an LNG plant in the Far East, and has been losing interest in 
the overland pipeline. It is considering supplying the more 
expensive LNG to South Korea by sea rather than continue to 
engage in this tug-of-war over the pipeline. 
Given the right political atmosphere, other trilateral and 
multilateral projects could be initiated. For example, South 
Korean investment could be used for modernizing―with the 
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use of Russian technology―industrial objects in the North once 
built with Soviet assistance such as metallurgy, building materials 
and mineral excavation. North Koreans are especially interested 
in modernizing the power plants. South Korean companies 
might also be interested in hiring North Korean workers at their 
assembly and other plants in Russia. Such a practice would be a 
valuable example of North-South cooperation in third countries 
without the limitations of the political realities on the Korean 
Peninsula, in addition to being commercially profitable.
The above considerations do not mean that Russia supports 
“perpetuation” of the division of Korea and would not like to 
see a change in North Korea. On the contrary, it is working on 
reducing tension and promoting peaceful dialogue, cooperation, 
and eventual reconciliation between the two Koreas. In the 
distant future that process might lead to economic integration 
and a creation of a unified state, passing through a number 
of stages. Russia hopes such a state would be neutral and not 
hostile to Russia. 
However, at the moment Russia deems it desirable to preserve 
both countries’ statehood while promoting change in North 
Korea. But to start this process, Russia believes North Korea 
should have security guarantees for the existing regime, 
however bizarre and unpleasant it is. There are simply no better 
alternatives: it is the best of the bad options. 
Regrettably, this is far from where events are leading. North Korea 
is under increasing pressure and finds itself more isolated than 
ever. Moreover, the main purpose of Kim Jong-un’s regime is to 
survive and therefore postpone any changes. The simultaneous 
deterioration of relations between Moscow and the West, 
rapprochement between Russia and the DPRK, and the wedge 
between DPRK and China created a window of opportunity for 
North Korea’s continued isolation. Some experts suggest the 
situation has become even more conducive to North Korea 
maintaining its old practices, including keeping South Korea at 
a distance. 
This is an understandable reaction as inter-Korean relations have 
unfortunately remained unchanged for decades. The goals of the 
Korean War were not reached by any party, and each believes 
that only complete victory over the enemy and its capitulation 
can put it to end. North Koreans do have reason to believe that 
the “change of regime” concept and eventual disappearance of 
their statehood still remains the basis for the  U.S.-South Korean 
vision of the fate of North Korea. The basic understanding of the 
situation in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo remains much the 
same as immediately following the fall of the communist system. 
At that time, the widespread belief was that the DPRK would 
soon follow suit of the European communist countries and be 
unified under Seoul’s rule. No one, including China, dared to 
oppose this process. These expectations turned out to be wrong; 
nevertheless, the anticipation of the “imminent collapse” of the 
DPRK as the prerequisite for unification of Korea has remained 
the mainstream view of South Korean and  U.S. political thinking 
for the last quarter-century. During the current administration 
period these hopes in the South, to the view of an outside 
observer, might have even become stronger.
The author believes a collapse scenario is even less likely today than 
in the 1990s when North Korea suddenly lost much of its external 
support, plunged into an unprecedented economic crisis, and 
did not have any “nuclear deterrent.” Today the new geopolitical 
situation—including the above-mentioned stand-off between the 
U.S. and Russia as well as the rivalry (milder in magnitude, but 
greater in scope) between the  U.S. and China—gives little hope 
for a possibility that the North Korean state can be brought down 
peacefully in a “soft landing” scenario and its territory taken by 
one of the competing “camps” in a serene manner. 
What about unification then? Unfortunately, Koreans are not 
given a chance to solve their problems by themselves. Korea may 
yet again become a flashpoint of a great power competition, 
given that the most antagonistic couples (China-U.S., Russia-U.S., 
China-Japan) have their own interests in the region. The situation 
resembles the 1950-1980s period: client states and their great 
power supporters. This has become especially noticeable when 
North Korea started the old game of “balancing” between China 
and Russia (if not allies, at least non-hostile partners), trying to 
capitalize on their difficult relations with the United States.
The current reality is much more complicated than during the 
Cold War era. Back then, security on the Korean Peninsula was 
more or less guaranteed by the antagonistic (and more or less 
equal in military power - at least in destructive ability) nuclear 
superpowers, and the two Koreas could not do that much to 
bring themselves together. They could also not deepen their 
conflict, to where it might become a “hot” one. Now we witness 
a complicated interplay of controversial national interests of 
both big and small powers. 
China, who had supported the DPRK in the Cold War era without 
any reservations, has changed its position. On the one hand, 
China is interested in preserving the status quo and keeping 
the state of North Korea in place. On the other hand, the North 
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Korean regime’s internal policies and provocative external 
behavior causes more and more irritation in China. But China 
cannot afford losing an important buffer and seeing the whole of 
Korea becoming a sphere of  U.S. influence. That would be seen 
as a major setback in geopolitical competition, the magnitude of 
U.S. losing control over Cuba in the early 1960s which through 
the Cuban missile crisis almost led to a third World War.
The possibility of changing the regime to a more loyal and 
predictable one must have crossed the minds of Chinese policy 
makers. The paranoically suspicious North Korean leaders might 
feel or suspect it. Therefore China must be increasingly perceived 
in Pyongyang as an existential threat rather than an ally. Some 
suggest that its nuclear and missile program, developed by 
North Korea with vigor, is meant as a hedge not so much against 
the United States and South Korea, but China. Getting closer to 
Russia as a balancer fits well into this picture. 
Therefore rapprochement with South Korea and concessions 
would not help Pyongyang much in regime conservation. It should 
be noted that there are few objective reasons for the North 
to shift its diplomatic focus and hopes for solving its problems 
from big international actors – especially the  U.S. and China – to 
South Korea. Therefore, conciliatory steps by Pyongyang towards 
Seoul, including concessions, cannot be expected if there is no 
reciprocity. And reciprocity from the South does not mean “small 
carrots” (such as aid) in Pyongyang’s eyes. But the ROK’s hands 
are tied as the  U.S. does not want to accept North Korea’s nuclear 
status and would control the extent to which South Korea may 
assist stabilization of the North. 
At the same time a limited economic liberalization underway 
in North Korea eases the economic situation and makes 
aid from the South less crucial. What really matters for 
Pyongyang is the lifting of sanctions and regaining access to 
the international financial system, but this also depends on 
the  U.S. Thus Seoul could mean no more than a stopover on 
the way to Washington. 
On the other hand, for Pyongyang, decreasing hostility towards 
the South may have an unwelcome demobilizing effect on the 
North Korean population and create new channels for Southern 
“soft power” penetration, which may be dangerous for the regime.
Therefore, the author believes that if the ROK would not reconsider 
the basic concept of its unification policy, the pendulum “from 
tension to détente” will keep on swinging.
What is the Alternative?
Is there a way out of the impasse and what role can both Koreas 
play at this point? What, other than the unlikely change of regime 
in North Korea, can be compatible with South Korean interests and 
not contradict  the U.S., China, and other countries’ interests?
Such a concept should provide for “conventionalizing” North 
Korea to the extent it would become a normal and accepted 
member of the international community with a market economy, 
participation (if limited) of the population in governance, and 
non-excessive defense capabilities (not needing extraordinary 
means such as nuclear weapons or cyber warfare capabilities) to 
preserve its sovereignty and independence. Evolutional internal 
reforms would be needed, but they are impossible in the absence 
of a security guarantee for the ruling regime. So far, the  U.S. and 
its allies have never accepted such a possibility, as it contradicted 
both moral and ideological interests and pragmatic military-
political objectives. 
If a new policy is to be introduced, the difference with previous 
half-hearted attempts with a “hidden agenda,” like the Sunshine 
Policy, should be that it must take into consideration the interests 
of the Northern ruling class. The root of the problem seems to 
be the regretful misunderstanding in Washington and Seoul of 
the North Korean political elite. Because they are supported 
by the North Korean population, any idea of unification based 
upon circumventing or destroying the North Korean ruling elite 
is doomed to failure.
Such a strategy is based on misjudgment of North Korean 
reality. The North Korean political system is actually not an 
isolated family dictatorship, but a hereditary aristocracy/
meritocracy, created much along the lines of Confucian 
tradition, already in its third and fourth generation. It cannot 
be lured into partial concessions. Unlike in former USSR or 
communist countries, neither the members of the current 
elite nor their siblings could hope to become successful 
capitalists or officials under any new South-dominated regime. 
Obviously, after a South Korea-led unification, the elite class 
can expect persecution or relegation to outlaw status. And it 
should be well understood, that even an end to Kim’s dynasty 
would not mean the destruction of the system — a new royal 
clan will seize power, maybe with foreign assistance. History 
of monarchies, including the Korean one, should give a clue 
to what might happen. And thus the division of the Korean 
nation would be prolonged if not perpetuated.
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If we are to analyze North Korean goals vis-à-vis the South, it 
is very hard to believe that the goals of “communization” of 
the Korean Peninsula (for which the disengagement of the 
United States is a prerequisite) could still remain a guiding light 
for North Korean policy makers as it was in the 1960s-1980s, 
although such a vision might still be referred to in Pyongyang. For 
any practical intents and purposes, the North Korean aim is to 
contain South Korea, prevent it from taking over the North, and 
to exert as much assistance as possible by different means: from 
blackmailing in a “sea of fire” style to appealing to its common 
ethnic heritage and tradition. Unification does not enter into this 
picture any time soon.
ROK inflexibility on its basic concept of “southernization” of 
the North gives Pyongyang, as shown before, no incentive to 
change its hostile stance and egoistic approaches. Attempts to 
start a dialogue with the South (periodically resurfacing since 
January 2014, when the DPRK National Defense commission 
addressed the ROK with a broad suggestion for “improving 
inter-Korean relations with the united power of the Korean 
nation”) are therefore futile.
Seoul’s current public view on the prospects of reunification 
includes three steps: removing nuclear weapons; building up inter-
Korean rapprochement; and creating a conducive international 
environment. How acceptable is this to North Korea? The author 
believes it is not a realistic recipe. For example, the reaction of 
President Park Geun-hye to the idеa of an inter-Korean summit, 
proposed by Kim Jong-un in early 2015, was dubious—on the 
one hand, agreement to the summit without conditions was 
stated, on the other, the same old rhetoric of “sincerity” and 
denuclearization was repeated. Most of Seoul’s initiatives 
could hardly get off the ground. For example, the plan, which 
proposed a railway connecting Seoul to the North Korean cities 
of Pyongyang and Sinuiju, the establishment of cultural centers in 
both capitals, and a number of commemorative events marking 
the 70th anniversary of liberation from Japanese colonial rule was 
not realistic enough. Such proposals did not look very convincing 
when Seoul continued joint military exercises with the  U.S. and 
resorted to even stricter observance of the National Security law, 
which essentially criminalizes support for Pyongyang. The efforts 
of civil groups to send leaflets to North Korea were not stopped, 
although the government does have authority to do so. Later, a 
row burst out at the Kaesong Industrial Complex regarding North 
Korea’s decision to unilaterally increase the wages of its workers. 
In May, North Korea issued a warning to the South Korean navy, 
saying it would fire upon any vessel that crosses the disputed 
maritime border, the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea. 
Another irritant was the test firing of a ballistic missile from a 
submarine (which is clearly provocative, even if there are doubts 
on what really happened).
Therefore, Russian experts conclude that the ROK unification 
policy remained half-hearted and with a “double agenda.” As 
well-known scholar Leonid Petrov noted, “The fallacy of this 
proposal is rooted in ROK’s reluctance to recognize the legitimacy 
of DPRK regime and, therefore, to effectively end the Korean 
War…Without abolishing the respective National Security Laws, 
no inter-Korean economic projects can be sustainable…South 
Korea cannot build trust with North Korea and simultaneously 
practice landing operation with U.S. Army.”4 Compatibility 
between current basic strategies of the North and South in 
unification matters is very limited.
The possibilities are there. The question is the political will – 
not lacking on the Russian side, as many (but not all) experts in 
Moscow see Korea as a possible field for multilateral cooperation 
(with U.S. involvement, which is now important for Russia. Of 
course, the  U.S. role is crucial. However at this point, it is South 
Korea that should take the driver’s seat. Isn’t it time for Seoul to 
change the approach—recognize geopolitical realities as well as 
the resilience of the North Korean regime that could, unfortunately 
for the North Korean population if a chance for its evolution is lost 
again, linger on for many decades? Isn’t it time for South Korea to 
work out a new policy and then persuade the United States that 
this policy can also be beneficial for American interests? Seoul 
should grab the opportunity of the potential readiness of Kim 
Jong-un’s younger leadership for a compromise (demonstrated on 
many occasions, but interrupted when met with a cool response by 
military psychosis and belligerent propaganda blasts). That could 
also soften the regime, now exceeding its predecessor in terror 
tactics.
What could be the essence of the new policy? Such a policy 
could only be one of engagement. The author believes the ROK 
government might declare the start of a new cycle of national 
reconciliation by changing its overall approach, and lifting the 
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